ער נוצט דאס אלס א סארט ווערסיע פונעם ארגומענט פון מאראליטעט להוכיח מציאות הא-ל: אט די ״סוּפּריִם בּיִאיִנג״ וואס האט געמאכט די וועלט (בהנחה אז עס איז אזוי), האט דאך אריינגעגעבן אט די מאראלישע געפיהל פון ווי אזוי די וועלט ״באדארף״ צו זיין. ועפי״ז, כעין הרס״ג, איז ער מוכיח מציאות גן עדן ועולם שכולו טוב. ווי ער שרייבט:In his Dialogues, Hume delivered a classic statement of the problem of evil as an argument against classic theism. None of the participants in the dialogue is an atheist, but Philo, the character who perhaps is closest to reflecting Hume’s actual views defends a minimal sort of theism/ deism that denies the moral attributes of the deity. Philo acknowledges that it is reasonable to infer that something like a human mind, though possessed of much greater powers, created our world. But what he emphatically denies is that the creator is good in any sense resembling the ordinary meaning of that word. Moreover, he insists that affirming such a deity is functionally identical with atheism since his existence has no practical or religious implications. Indeed, the most probable judgment is that the creator is simply amoral, with no concern whatever for either good or evil, since our world is a puzzling mixture of both of these
Philo argues that the creator is not good, and that reason is that our world clearly was not built for the happiness of its inhabitants. Despite the fact that it is a mixture of good and evil, it is not conducive to the flourishing of its sentient creatures. The misery of the human condition in particular is spelled out in eloquent terms by both Philo and Demea, the latter of whom is an orthodox believer who defends God’s goodness on the ground that everything will be made right in the life to come
In the conversation, Philo employs an analogy to argue that this world is not at all the sort of world we would expect a very powerful, wise and benevolent deity to create:
Did I show you a house or palace where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold, you would certainly blame the contrivance without any further examination . . . .you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the architect
It is very much worth emphasizing that, while Hume made much of the problem of evil, in one sense he simply dissolved the problem. For one of his key arguments was that this world is not the sort of world we would expect, a priori, that an all-powerful, wise, and benevolent deity would create. Given the clash between our a priori expectations, and the actual world, we have no reason to believe it was created by such a God. The problem, then, persists only for those who believe in such a God
By contrast, however, if the Supreme Being is amoral, if he is simply indifferent to good and evil, and to whether or not we are happy, well, the world as we know it is not at all surprising. Suffering and misery is a problem for those who believe God is all-powerful, knowing, and good, because it is hard to account for on those terms, and requires some sort of explanation of how it is compatible with the existence and purposes of such a God. But if God is morally indifferent, there is no good reason to think such evil is fundamentally at odds with him and whatever purposes he may have, and indeed, perhaps it is as much to be expected as any other scenario. In that sense, evil is not a problem in the classic sense of the word. It still poses practical problems to be sure, and challenges to cope with it, but it is not at odds with what we should expect, and it should not elicit the same sort of perplexity and outrage as it should if it is profoundly at odds with ultimate reality. Indeed, Hune insisted that happiness was not even to be dreamed of, and that the best course to take in light of this was to maintain “as far as possible, a mediocrity, and a kind of insensibility, in everything”
In her book Evil in Modern Thought (2002), Susan Neiman tells the story of how the modern world increasingly came to cope with the problem of evil by denying its reality, decreasing its scope, or defining it out of existence. Particularly after the Lisbon earthquake, the natural world was stripped of moral significance, and natural evil was eliminated as a meaningful category. Moreover, as the modern period moved more explicitly in the direction of naturalism, eventually even moral evil was diminished as human beings came increasingly to be seen as part and parcel of the larger natural order. The final chapter of her book is tellingly entitled “Homeless” and there she reiterates the dilemmas that must be faced by inhabitants of our world who experience it as hostile to our happiness and flourishing, but cannot dispense with moral judgments. “For those who refuse to give up moral judgments, the demand that they stop seeking the unity of nature and morality means accepting a conflict in the heart of being that nothing will ever resolve”
Later in the chapter, she notes Kant’s conviction that our drive to seek reason in the world “is as deep as any drive we have. It’s this urge that keeps the problem of evil alive even after hopes of resolving it are abandoned.” This urge manifests itself in our deep rooted conviction that the is and the ought should converge, and it is this conviction that drives the metaphysical enterprise. “We proceed on the assumption that the true and the good, and just possibly the beautiful, coincide. Where they do not, we demand an account”
ער שטעלט דאס אויך צאם מיט׳ן ארגומענט פון דיזייר, וואו מ׳לעכצט צו עפעס טיעפערס וואס מ׳קען אפילו נישט מצייר זיין געהעריג, וועלכע ווייזט אויף א טיעפערע רעאליטעט.If the Supreme Being shares the moral judgments he has structured us to make, we have reason to believe He desires our happiness and wants to promote it (here I will ignore the option that God could be evil. I offer some argument against taking this option seriously in other works of mine). But to believe this is to embrace the problem of evil with all its jagged edges, and acknowledge that the way the world is leaves us far short of the happiness we crave. It is to continue to make the moral judgment that the world is not the way it ought to be, and frankly to own the fact that we are not at home in the world as it currently is. However, to embrace the problem of evil in this fashion is better than merely dissolving it as Hume and other modern thinkers did. To hold fast to the conviction that the world ought to be different than it is because it is at odds with the ultimate purposes of a God who is perfectly good as well as all powerful and knowing is to hold out the hope that it will eventually be the sort of world it ought to be. It is to have reason to believe that we shall yet arrive at home
דר. עוואן פעילס שרייבט דערויף אין א רעצענזיע:
***Perhaps Walls is correct that Heaven is our true and best hope. Or perhaps one might accept the view of some of the Jewish sages, of Melville, and of Ivan Karamazov, that the greatest problem we face is how we can forgive God
פריער האב איך צוגעברענגט:
דר. האָדסאן נוצט די געדאנק אויך לגבי תחיית המתים און די אקטועלע מקומות פון גן עדן וגיהנום - זיי זענען אין אנדערע "הייפּערטיימס" אין וועלכע די מענטשן (אדער פונקטליכע קאַפּיס פון זיי) ווערן אריינגעשטעלט. דאס ארבעט אפילו טאמער נעמט מען אָן מאטעריעליזם און מ'נעמט נישט אָן דועליזם. ווי אויך קומט אויס דערפון אז עס איז שייך אז א מענטש זאל זיין אין גיהנום לעולם, אבער דאך ווערן געראטעוועט ארויס - קאַפּיס אין אַן אנדערן "הייפּערטיים". ווי ער שרייבט:מי אני האט געשריבן: ↑זונטאג יאנואר 14, 2024 8:02 pmדר. האָד האָדסאן טענה'ט אז "זמן"/ספּעיסטיים ארבעט עפ"י די גראָאיִנג בּלאַק יוּניווערס מאדעל. דאס באדייט אז ספּעיסטיים איז בעצם א וואקסענדיגע בּלאַק, וואו די עבר און הוה זענען "עכט" וקים, בשעת די עתיד (נאך) נישט (ועיין כאן וכאן). "הייפּערטיים" באדייט וואו עס זענען דא מערערע פון די סארט בּלאַקס (וכעין א מאָלטיווערס, נאר ביחס צו פארשידענארטיגע ספּעיסטיימס). און ער טענה'ט אז עס איז יתכן א "הייפּערטיים היפּאטעזיע", וואו עס זענען פארהאן מערערע ספּעיסטיים בּלאַקס. ועפי"ז טענה'ט ער אז צו טענה'ן קעגן מציאות הא-ל בעד די רעות וואס מ'זעהט, דארף מען נישט נאר אָננעמען אז דאס איז נישט דאס בעסטע וועלט שייך, נאר מ'דארף אָננעמען אז אונזער ספּעיסטיים איז ניטאמאל א חלק פונעם בעסטן וועלט מעגליך - מיינענדיג, אז מ'דארף דאס שוין טענה'ן אויף די גאנצע סעט פונעם הייפּערטיים, וואס איז יתכן אז אונזער ספּעיסטיים איז א חלק פון. און דאס איז שוין א שווערערע טענה.
ער טענה'ט נאך מער, אז מעטאפיזיש גערעדט, איז עס פונקט אזוי מסתבר אז אזוי ווי די ספּעיסטיים בּלאַק קען וואקסן, וואס עס טוהט דאך כסדר כנ"ל, קען עס בעצם קלענער ווערן און עס קען "אפגעשניטן" ווערן דערפון; עס איז נישט בעצם מן הנמנע. וא"כ וויל ער עפי"ז קלערן אז מ'קען בעצם זאגן אז סיי מעשה בראשית אזוי ווי עס שטייט אין די תורה כפשוטו ממש, און סיי די סייענטיפישע קאנסענסוס ווי אזוי עס איז צוגעגאנגן, וועלכע איז בהדיא דערקעגן, זענען ביידע אמת ביינאזאם. און דאס איז ווייל מעיקרא איז די בּלאַק געווען און געוואקסן אזוי ווי עס שטייט אין די תורה און אזוי האט זיך עס פארמירט. אבער לאחר חטא אדה"ר וצאתו מגן עדן, האט הקב"ה אפגעשניטן דעם עבר פון דעם בּלאַק, און צוגעטשעפעט דערצו די עבר פון אַן אנדערן בּלאַק אין הייפּערטיים, וואס דאס איז די עבר פון די סייענטיפיק קאנסענסוס וועלכע אונזער ספּעיסטיים האט כהיום, לאזענדיג דעם הוה וואו אדם און חוה זענען געווען יעצט צוזאמען מיט אנדערע האָמינידס וכדומה. דר. דאָסטין קראָמעט טענה'ט אבער אז וואס איז די סיבה אז ג-ט זאל אזוי טוהן מחמת חטא עץ הדעת? (אזא סארט בונה עולמות ומחריבן, און דאס וואס הקב״ה האט געזאגט לאדה״ר בנוגע עצי הגן, קה״ר ז יג, תן דעתך שלא תקלקל ותחריב את עולמי ע״ש.)
ועיין בדברי דר. האָדסאן לעיל.
איך האב געקלערט אז מ'קען אפשר זאגן בדרך רמז בזה אז די ערשטע ברכה פון ברכות ק"ש של שחרית הייבט זיך אָן מיט וואס איז מיוסד עה"פ בישעיה (מה ז) יוצר אור ובורא חשך עשה שלום ובורא רע, ועיין בברכות יא:. וא"כ קען מען זאגן אז דערפאר זאגט מען אין די ערשטע ברכה של ברכות ק"ש של ערבית, משנה עתים ומחליף את הזמנים. והיינו, לרמז אז ג-ט האט באשאפן מערערע ספּעיסטיים בּלאַקס, ועכ"כ אז ער האט געטוישט פון איין בּלאַק צום צווייטן וכדברי דר. האָדסאן כנ"ל, וואס די געדאנק טוהט פארמינערן פונעם תלונה פון דעם אז עס איז דא א בריאת רע בהעולם וכנ"ל, וואס פון די פסוק בישעיה פון "בורא רע" איז די נוסח פונעם ערשטן ברכה מברכות ק"ש של שחרית מיוסד.
דר. עוואן פעילס שרייבט דערויף אין א רעצענזיע:The Hypertime Solution, then, simply amounts to the thesis that the General Resurrection occurs in the hyperfuture rather than the future. Heaven lies not to the left or right, forth or back, high or low, or even in the future. From dust we came and to dust we shall (permanently) return, and yet heaven and the judgment of the living and the dead await us hyperhence. On the Hypertime Solution, to be resurrected is to be present at a special place in the hyperfuture — to be among those located in a privileged spacetime block with its own past and never-ending future, perfectly suited to host the new and imperishable, spiritual bodies that hyperwill populate it
Of course, if the Hypertime Solution has any promise, one may suspect that the roads to hell and Purgatory may cut through hypertime, as well, and there is one remarkable feature of this thought I can’t resist noting: The resources would be here available to maintain (i) that hell is a real place (i.e., yet another spacetime block confined to a different location in the hyperfuture), (ii) that it is populated, (iii) that its residents are permanent inhabitants (i.e., that assignment to hell is an eternal sentence), and (iv) that Universalism is true, nevertheless. With hell and heaven so separated, some may be consigned to eternal damnation and hyper-eventually saved all the same
(ועיין באשכול זו.)In his short piece, Hudson presses the advantages of his proposal that we are resurrected in the hyperfuture rather than the future; that is, into a space-time block, distinct from ours, situated in an additional temporal dimension: hypertime. The conceptual resources of the hypertime model are fairly remarkable, perhaps even paradoxical: as Hudson notes with some bemusement, it allows, not only for a hypertime heaven but for a hypertime hell, and for the possibility that some (or all) human beings consigned to hell might also enter into eternal salvation in some hyperfuture. Might it go without saying (and Hudson doesn't say it) that perhaps some (or all) of the saved also enter into eternal perdition in some hypertime future?
***
דר. נאָרמאן סוואַזאָ ברענגט צו פון דר. ריטשערד רובּענשטיין נאכ׳ן שואה:
Like Kierkegaard, I have had to choose between a world without the biblical God and the leap into faith. I have had a slightly different “Either-or” than Kierkegaard. I have had to decide whether to affirm the existence of a God who inflicts Auschwitz on his guilty people or to insist that nothing the Jews did made them more deserving of auschwitz than any other people, that Auschwitz was in no sense a punishment, and that a God who would or could inflict such punishment does not exist. In other words, I have elected to accept what camus rightly called the courage of the absurd, the courage to live in a meaningless, purposeless cosmos rather than believe in a God who inflicts Auschwitz on his people
I have done so as a rabbi and a theologian in the full knowledge that my choice has been rejected by my people. Nevertheless, I would rather be rejected by my people than affirm their guilt at Auschwitz
I was listening to a German clergyman interpret German defeat as the rabbis had interpreted the fall of Jerusalem almost two thousand years before. For the rabbis, Jerusalem fell because of the sins of the Jewish people. Can we really blame the christian community for viewing us through the prism of a mythology of history when we were the first to assert this history of ourselves? Does the way Jews regard themselves religiously contribute to the terrible process?
