אחרי אשר קצץ אלישע בפרדס האלהי את הנטיעה העיקרית והראשית הוא היחוד המוחלט של האלהות ית‘, וחשב כמו המינים והמקובלים שיש שותף להקב"ה במעשה בראשית, הוסיף לטייל בפרדס ארוכות וקצרות בחקירת ההנהגה וההשגחה בעולם השפל, והואיל למשמש ולפשפש בנטיעה אחרת, גפן אדרת בחקרי לב חכמים, היא השאלה הקדמוניה על צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו, יסורי הצדיקים ושלות הרשעים, שאלות הידיעה והבחירה, היא השאלה, עם תולדותיה בשכר ועונש, העצומע והקשה, אשר תשובה נכונה עליה היא מן “עניינים אשר אין בטבע האנושי שישיגם בשום פנים ולא בסבה אבל שערי השגתם נעולים בפניו” (המורה ל"א לראשון), ובשאלה הנבוכה הזאת מצא אלישע כי כבר פסח על סעיפיה המספק הקדמון ‏מחבר ספר הקהלת, באשר היה רע עליו המעשה שנעשה תחת השמש, בראותו דמעות עשוקים באין מנחם, במצאו כי מקום המשפט שם הרשע, כי יש צדיקים שמגיע אליהם כמעשה הרשעים, ורשעים שמגיע אליהם כמעשה הצדיקים, וכי יש צדיק אובד בצדקו ורשע מאריך ברעתו, וינסה בחכמה ויאמר אחכמה והיא רחוקה ממני, וירא את כל מעשה האלהים כי לא יוכל האדם למצא את הנעשה תחת השמש בשל אשר יעמול האדם לבקש ולא ימצא, גם אם יאמר החכם לדעת לא יוכל למצוא (עיין ע“ז במ”ע לרמע“ה א”ב פ' ט"ו), ואז התחיל לשפוק ולפון בכל מהות השגחה והנהגה ויעוד האדם ושכר ועונש. והוא פוסח על סעיפים שונים: פעם מתאונן ומתרעם לאמר, ענין רע נתן אלקים לבני אדם לענות בו תחת השמש; ופעם הוא כופר בידיעה ובהשגחה לאמר, עזב ה’ את הארץ בידי המקרה, כי הכל כאשר לכל מקרה אחד לצדיק ולרשע לטוב ולטהור ולטמא וגו‘, כי מקרה אחד לכל כי עת וּפגע יקרה את כלם, ופעם הוא מכחש בבחירה החפשית שבאדם ואומר, כי כל אשר יעשה אלקים הוא יהיה לעולם עליו אין להוסיף וממנו אין לגרוע מעות לא יוכל לתקון וחסרון לא יוכל להמנות כי לא יוכל לדון עם שהתקיף ממנו; ופעם הוא כופר בתחית המתים ובשכר ועונש לעוה"ב ומחליט, כי אין מעשה וחשבון ודעת בשאול אשר אתה הולך שמה, והמתים אינם יודעים מאומה, ואין להם עוד שכר; ומספק גם בהשארת הנפש באמרו, מי יודע רוח בני האדם העולה היא למעלה וגו’ ומותר האדם מן הבהמה אין כי הכל הבל. היא השאלה הקדמוניה אשר למענה נבראו איוב ושלשת רעיו (עיין מ“ע בפ' הנ”ל) בספר ויכוחי קדמונים בכתבי הקדש (שעליו ועל ביאורו כונן הרמב"ם בנ' מספרו כל שיטתו בתשובת השאלה ההיא) אשר מצא בו אלישע, כי איש תם וישר ירא אלהים וסר מרע, אשר היה עינים לעור רגלים לפסח ואב לאביונים, נרדף מחמת השטן להכותו מכה רבה ונוראה בגופו ובממונו וביוצאי ירכו להשמיד ולהרוג ולכלות זעמו בו, והאומלל ההוא מתאונן על השופט כל הארץ שלא יעשה משפט, בתתו אור וחיים למרי נפש, והוא יוצר האדם וידע מראשית יצר לבבו הרע, ולמה בראו למפגע לו; ובמר נפשו כפר בתחית המתים, ואמר כלה ענן וילך כן יורד שאול לא יעלה; וכפר בשכר ועונש לאמר, אם שוט ימית פתאום למסת נקיים ילעג, וכפר בהשגחה באמרו, ואלוק לא ישים תפלה וגו' (ונודע כמה כפירות ומינות יחסו חכמי התלמוד לאיוב – בבא בתרא טז. – ואמרו עליו שבקש להפוך הקערה על פיה, שבקש ליפטר את כל העולם מן הדין, שכפר בתחית המתים וכו' ע”ש).

אחרי אשר העיון והמחקר בשאלות ובספרים ובענינים כאלה הביאוהו לכפור בתחית המתים ובשכר ועונש לעוה"ב, לא נשאר לאלישע שום אמצעי לתשובת השאלה ההיא על מציאות הרע הטבעי והמוסרי בעולם, אשר כמו בעיון כן חזקה עליו במעשה בכל יום. בראותו בבקעת גינוסר, בעודנו יושב ושונה,‏ אדם אחד עולה לראש הדקל בשבת, ונוטל משם קן צפור האם על הבנים, ויורד בשלום, ובמוצאי שבת ראה אדם אחר עולה לראש הדקל ונוטל הבנים ומשלח האם כמצוה, וירד והכישו נחש ומת, ובראותו לשונו של ר' יהודה הנחתום, אחד מעשרה הרוגי המלכות במלחמת בר כוזיבא, או של רבי חוצפית המתורגמן נתון בפי כלב שותת דם (ירושלמי חגיגה שם) או בפי חזיר (בבלי קידושין ל"ט) או מוטלת באשפה (חולין בבלי קמ"ב); כי אם לעמוד על דעתו השוללת, להאמין ברשות אחרת המביאה רעה לעולם, ולהחליט שאין מתן שכר ואין תחית המתים (ירושלמי חגיגה ה' ומ“ר רות וקהלת הנ”ל), ובזאת היתה מציאת הרע בעולם סבה ראשית למינות אחר, כמו למינות כל מיני המינים שהוזכרנו בפרקים הקודמים והבאים, מן המנים עד מני הפרסי ותלמידיו.

The worst pain a man can suffer is to have insight into much and power over nothing

The “woman at the window” image highlights Michal’s sexual jealousy, kindled by observing David dancing among the women and inadvertently exposing himself. She later claims that she despises David for dancing as one of the simple people

The contrast between the young Michal who loved David and the Michal who now despises him summarizes her tragedy, which is reinforced in the final statement that ends her narrative. Michal here is still recognized only as the dead king’s daughter. David forced her return to him from her second husband who loved her, but he has received her only as token of his political triumph, not as a wife. Michal’s angry words thus may be an expression of humiliation and pent-up fury toward the neglectful David, now husband of at least six other wives (2 Sam 3:2–5), who has withdrawn his sexual favors and thus doomed his loving first wife to the additional heartbreak of childlessness

I do not have space to discuss whether or not any of the theistic responses outlined here succeeds in solving the existential problem of systemic evil. What is crucial here is that whether or not any of them succeeds, theists are significantly better situated than atheists are with respect to the existential problem of systemic evil. They have in their ontology much greater, and possibly infinitely greater, resources than atheists to which they can appeal in defending theism. By appealing to items beyond the material universe, such as God and the afterlife, theists can develop numerous approaches to the problem, approaches to which atheists have no access. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that the existential problem of systemic evil is primarily a problem of evil for atheists

One might claim that the existential problem of systemic evil does not arise for atheists who endorse moral non­cognitivism. These atheists seem to be able to avoid the problem because they maintain, for instance, that the proposition that natural selection is evil does not express any truth­value. This claim, however, seems too strong, because if non­-cognitivism is true, then the existential problem of systemic evil does not arise for theists, either. One might at this point reformulate the claim in question as follows: the existential problem of systemic evil does not arise for atheists who endorse moral non-cognitivism, while it does arise for theists who reject moral non-cognitivism. In order to respond to this, it seems that theists have to decide whether or not moral non­cognitivism is indeed true. However, whether or not moral non­ cognitivism is true, atheists seem to remain on shaky ground because: (i) if moral non­cognitivism is true, then the existential problem of systemic evil arises for neither theists nor atheists; (ii) if moral non­ cognitivism is false, then the problem arises for both theists and atheists

We normally take for granted that the problem of evil provides a reason to give up theism and a motivation to adopt atheism. Yet, if I am right, it might be the other way around. The problem of evil, or at least the existential problem of systemic evil, provides a reason to give up atheism and a motivation to adopt theism

I am not sure how this resolves the apparent inconsistency between existential optimism and systemic evil, an inconsistency that the existential problem of systemic evil tries to reveal. People do tend to express their gratitude for the yellow (i.e., the positive things in the world and life) without fully recognizing the grey (negative things in the world and life, particularly the pain and suffering of uncountably many sentient animals systemically necessitated by the process of natural selection). As Gleeson says, the apparent inconsistency is often invisible to ordinary people, who tend to be “colour­blind,” but that does not mean that being colour­blind is a good way

מי אני האט געשריבן: ↑מאנטאג נאוועמבער 06, 2023 7:40 pm דאס איז בעצם היק׳ס/איראַנעיען ״נשמה-מאכן״ טעאדיסי, וואו די רעות זענען לטובת דעם מענטש אים שטערקער צו מאכן און אים בויען וכדומה. און ווי ניטשע האט געזאגט, ״וואס הרג׳עט דיר נישט, מאכט דיר שטערקער.״ (לכאורה דארף מען ביי דעם אויך צוקומען צו דעם אז עס איז נמנע, אפילו פאר ג-ט, דאס צוצוברענגען באופן אחר, בעולם החומרי שלנו.)

At times, may I admit, I think the whole thing [i.e., the book of Job] is terribly funny. But irony is never really funny, is it? For what kind of universe must Job now live in? A meaningless universe mismanaged by a chaotic, capricious, jealous Tyrant

An age-old mythical motif — the determination of human fate in the divine council — is used in the prologue, only to come under attack in the poem. It seems that the poem unveils this vision of mythical action in order to challenge its ultimate adequacy. Such a God may still have the power to determine a person's destiny, but already the question is implicit whether this kind of God is still righteous and trustworthy

‏Job’s friends become increasingly ludicrous as they engage in an 'infinity of repetition'. 'Exaggeration', remarks Bergson, 'is always comic when prolonged and especially when prolonged' (quoted in Cox: 141). To put it another way: 'In ridiculing [they] become ridiculous' — which is a fundamental but paradoxical ingredient of comedy. From the outset both Job and the reader — albeit on different levels of knowledge — are keenly aware of the utter incongruity between the friends' speeches and Job's situation. The friends become cruelly and grotesquely comic as they strive with increasing dogmatism to apply their faulty solutions to the wrong problem — and the wrong person

משרשי המצוה לקבוע בנפשותינו כי השגחת השם ברוך הוא פרטית על כל אחד מבני אדם, וכי עיניו פקוחות על כל דרכיהם, כמו שכתוב (איוב לד כא) כי עיניו על דרכי איש וכל צעדיו יראה. ולכן הזהרנו לתת לב אל החלי הרע הזה ולחשב כי החטא גרם אותו, וכבר אמרו זכרונם לברכה (ערכין טז:), כי בחטא לשון הרע יבא ברוב ולא נקחנו דרך מקרה, ויש לנו לבוא אל הכהן שהוא העומד לכפרת החוטאים, ועם חברת המכפר אולי יהרהר בתשובה ויסגר קצת ימים כדי שישיב אל לבו עניניו במתון ויפשפש במעשיו (ברכות ה.), ולפעמים יסגר שני הסגרים שמא הרהר תשובה ולא תשובה שלמה לגמרי, כאלו תאמר על דרך משל שחשב להחזיר מחצית גזלתו, ואז יחדש בו השם ברוך הוא קצת סימנין שיסגר שנית אולי ישלים תשובתו ויטהר לגמרי.

וכל ענין הסגרין אלו יורה השגחתו ברוך הוא על כל דרכי האדם אחת לאחת. ולפי שהדעות רבות בהשגחת הא-ל על כל ברואיו, יבואו בה הרבה פסוקים במקרא והרבה מצות להורות על הענין מהיותו פנה גדולה בתורתנו. שיש כתות בני אדם יחשבו כי השגחת השם יתברך על כל המינין בפרט בין אנשים או כל שאר בעלי חיים, ויש מהן כתות יחשבו כי השגחת השם ברוך הוא על כל עניני העולם בין בעלי חיים או כל שאר דברים, כלומר שלא יתנועע דבר אחד קטן בעולם הזה רק בחפצו ברוך הוא ובגזרתו עד שיחשבו כי בנפל עלה אחד מן האילן הוא גזר עליו שיפל, ואי אפשר שיתאחר או יקדם זמן נפילתה אפילו רגע, וזה דעת רחוק הרבה מן השכל. ויש כתות רעות יחשבו שלא ישים השגחתו ברוך הוא כלל בכל עניני העולם השפל, בין באנשים או בשאר בעלי חיים, והוא דעת הכופרים, רע ומר. ואנחנו בעלי הדעת האמיתים לפי מה ששמעתי נשים השגחתו ברוך הוא על כל מיני בעלי חיים בכלל, שכל מין מן המינים הנבראים בעולם, יתקיים לעולם, לא יכלה ויאבד כלו, כי בהשגחתו ימצא קיום לכל דבר. ובמין האדם נאמין כי השגחתו ברוך הוא על כל אחד ואחד בפרט, והוא המבין אל כל מעשיהם (תהלים לג טו). וכן קבלנו מגדולינו, וגם נמצא על זה הרבה כתובים יורו כי הענין כן. ולכן הזהירתנו התורה כי בהגיע אל האדם החלי הרע, והוא הצרעת, שלא יקחנו דרך מקרה, רק יחשב מיד כי עונותיו גרמו וירחיק מחברת בני אדם כאדם המרחק מרע מעשיו, ויתחבר אל המכפר המרפא שבר החטא ויראה אליו נגעו, ובעצתו ובדבריו ובפשפוש מעשיו יוסר מעליו הנגע, כי הא-ל ברוך הוא שמשגיח עליו תמיד יראה מעשה תשובתו וירפאהו, וזהו ענין ההסגרין כמו שאמרנו.

אשרי אשר שם ה' מבטחו, וא"א לשום נברא לחיות בלתי שהבורא כל עולמים מחיה וזן אותו והכל בהשגחה, והגם שהרמב"ם ז"ל דעת אחרת לו בזה, אבל באמת לפי דעת חז"ל אפילו ציפור לא ניצוד בלתי השגחה מלמעלה, וכפי הידוע שכל מעשה בראשית המה בשביל האדם [ועיין במו"נ ח"ג פי"ג דדעת הרמב"ם אינו כן].

Like evil, entropy is a function of the processes of nature, not an autonomous entity in nature. As in theodicy, entropy is parasitic to natural processes, not a participant in those processes. Moreover, entropy represents an inevitable limitation on the varieties of processes which could occur according to the laws of physics, and as such it measures the distance of actual processes from their ideal. In Augustinian theodicy evil arises as the mark of brokenness of being, while in Irenaean theodicy the processes of spiritual growth are characterized by regress and diversion, the power of sin

In thermodynamics entropy represents a function which never decreases in closed systems. In systems contained as subsystems in larger ones it can decrease in the subsystem, but the entropy of the system as a whole must not decrease. Cast in religious language, we would expect to find an inevitable increase in the power of evil in communities that cut themselves off from the needs of the rest of humanity and the challenge of global pluralism, or among those who view the human species as fundamentally separate from the rest of nature. Of course, if we press the metaphor we would expect that any closed community could contain additional internal communities which could evolve toward virtue and blessedness, but at the cost of the inclusive system. In a broader sense, if applied to our planet even with all of its species, we are still isolated, at least culturally, from the rest of the universe, Perhaps only if we venture out into the universe to other worlds will we find temporary release from the inevitability of the second law at the personal and cultural level

I will venture to formalize this relationship in terms of the following working hypothesis: Although the characteristics of entropy and evil do not give direct support to one another, if evil is real in nature, entropy is what one would expect to find at the level of physical processes

Along with its functioning power, the form of evil is a central aspect in theology. Tillich, for example, discusses the form of evil in terms of the “structure of destruction,” suggesting that evil contains within it an order, which, though destructive, embodies a remorselessness and a directionality: “Even destruction has structures. It ‘aims’ at chaos, but as long as chaos is not attained, destruction must follow the structures of wholeness; and if chaos is attained, both structure and destruction have vanished”

Tillich leaves this metaphor tantalizing before us, without pursuing the details of this structure. Yet the fact that he refers to it is significant in itself. In classical statistical models of entropy one finds the familiar “bell-curve” form (the Gaussian distribution function) as the mathematical structure of chaos. This form acts as an identifying signature of randomness. Thermal equilibrium, the physical paradigm of a system in a state of maximum entropy, is precisely one whose states are governed by a Gaussian distribution function. The mathematical structure of entropy could suggest something about the specific form Tillich’s “structure of destruction” might take and, thus, in turn open Tillich’s metaphor for evil to further interpretation and extension. The detailed dynamics of systems approaching thermal equilibrium could magnify Tillich’s suggestion of the “aim” of chaotic behavior. Finally, if modern thermodynamics is brought into the discussion, new mathematical structures occur which drive our theological inquiry about disorder into areas still to be explored

The idea of the end of the world is intolerable only to modernist philosophy, which finds in the idea of unending temporal progress a pitiful substitute for the blessed hope of everlasting life, and in an evolving God a shadowy ghost of the unchanging Creator and Sustainer of the Universe... Modernist philosophy is, as I maintain, wrecked on the second law of thermodynamics; it is no wonder that it finds the situation intolerable, and wriggles piteously to escape from its toils

בְּתוֹךְ עַמִּי האט געשריבן: ↑זונטאג נאוועמבער 05, 2023 1:56 pm

מי אני האט געשריבן: ↑זונטאג נאוועמבער 05, 2023 12:21 pm אבער כמובן איז די עקזיסטענשאל פראבלעם דערין נאך אלס במקומה עומדת.)

כנראה לי איז יעדע בר דעת מסכים און פארשטייט אז ס׳לוינט צו אינוועסטן ובפרט ווען די ratio פונעם אינוועסטמענט איז באין ערוך ווייניגער ווי די ׳געין׳.

מי אני האט געשריבן: ↑זונטאג נאוועמבער 05, 2023 12:21 pm אבער כמובן איז די עקזיסטענשאל פראבלעם דערין נאך אלס במקומה עומדת.)

והנה כל תענוגי עוה"ז הם רק ממה שנפל בשבה"כ והוא פסולת ממש לגבי תענוג העליון וכנודע מענין יהי רקיע כו' מבדיל בין מים למים ולכן אין ערוך כלל וכלל כל תענוגי עוה"ז אלף שנה לגבי התענוג שעה א' בג"ע התחתון מה שהנשמות נהנין מזיו השכינה וכמארז"ל יפה שעה אחת של קורת רוח בעוה"ב מכל חיי העוה"ז דהיינו אפי' חיה בעוה"ז אלף שנה בתענוג גדול וכל טוב אין זה נחשב אפי' נגד שעה אחת של הקורת רוח שבעוה"ב לפי שהוא תענוג באופן אחר ומעלה עליונה לאין קץ על מהות התענוג היותר חשוב שבעוה"ז

וכל בחי' התענוג שבעוה"ז בכללו הוא רק מהשבירה שנפל פסולת כו' ואין ערוך מהות התענוג שבעוה"ז למהות התענוג שבג"ע התחתון כו' וגבוה מעל גבוה כו'

כי זהו פשיטא שהרי כל תענוגי עוה"ז אינן אלא פסולת ממה שנפלו בשבירת הכלים. ולכן ארז"ל על ר"ע כשהיה ק"ך מילין מכרך גדול של רומי ושמע קול הקריה הומה בחדוה ושמחה רבה ר"א ור"י בכו אבל ר"ע שחק ואמר אם לעוברי רצונו כך לעושי רצונו על אחת כמה וכמה שאם זה התענוג נמשך אפי' לעוברי רצונו כו'. כמארז"ל שאין לך עשב מלמטה שאין לו מזל מלמעלה כו' והמזל מקבל מע' שרים כו' שהם מקבלים משמרי אופנים בחי' שמרים ופסולת ומזה משפיעים כל תענוגי עוה"ז, ואין ערוך לפנימיות החיות שהוא זיו השכינה המתגלה בג"ע* שצדיקים יוש בים ונהנים מזיו השכינה עד שאמרו מוטב לידייניה וליתי לעלמא דאתי, לפי שכל יסורי גיהנם כדאי לו בשביל שיקבל אח"כ עונג העליון הנמשך מזיו השכינה ולכן ארז"ל אם לעוברי רצונו כך שנמשך כ"כ תענוג גדול בשפע השמרים והפסולת כש"כ שיומשך תענוג גדול בהגלות נגלות ענג העליון מזיו השכינה לע"ל

רביה''ק זי''ע האט געשריבן: ↑זונטאג דעצעמבער 09, 2018 9:39 pmאיך פארשטיי בכלל נישט די קשיא, פונקטליך וועלכע חלק אין די בריאה איז מחייב אז ס'זאלן נישט זיין קיין שוועריקייטן?

The problem of evil seems to result from two distinguishable functions that the idea of God has. It is an ultimate source of explanations of why things are as they are; it is also the embodiment of the very standard by which many of them are found wanting

מי אני האט געשריבן: ↑דאנערשטאג סעפטעמבער 28, 2023 12:29 pmענליך איז בנוגע דעם רמב״ם׳ס דיון איבער יכולת הקב״ה לגבי דעם פראבלעם פון שלעכטס. אויב איז ״ג-ט״ נישט קיין אגענט בכלל, הייבט זיך דאך לכאורה די פראבלעם עניוועי נישט אָן? איז פארוואס איז ער זיך מתמקד דערמיט? איז, ראשית כל, קען די פראבלעם פונקט אזוי נוגע זיין מיט דעם הגדרה(?) רזה פון ״פּרינציפּ פון עקזיסטענץ״, וואס מציאות איז כעין נובע דערפון אטאמאטיש כצל, וכדומה. מיינענדיג, די קשיא ווערט ריפארמיולירט אלס ״פארוואס איז נישט נובע דערפון בעסער?״ וואס אויף דעם קומט די תירוץ אז ס׳איז נישט שייך בעסער. (ועיין לעיל בהגדרת הנרבוני על ״יכול״ אין א טעאלאגישן קאנטעקסט, אליבא דהרמב״ם.)

און צוויי, ווי ארויסגעברענגט מערערע מאל אין מיין צוגעלינקטן אשכול על בעית הרעות, איז דער רמב״ם זיך אויך מתמקד מיט׳ן סאָבּדזשעקטיוו עקזיסטענשאל פראבלעם אויך און פון א פּעסטאָרעל מבט. און דאס באדייט זיך מתמקד זיין מיט דעם ״כאילו״ קאַנסטראָקט און מאדעל וואס דער מענטש, ואפילו הפילוסוף, טוהט צו זיך (בהכרח) אויף עפעס עפעס עפעס א לעוועל פּערסאַניפייען די קאַסמאָס ומציאות און די מושג פון ״ג-ט״.

חשוב׳ע מיטגליד האט געשריבן:אפילו זיך אויסגעבן אויף ג-ט לאזטו נישט צו. געוואלד, לאז לעבן ‏

יסוד כבוד ה' שהוא מקור כל השלימות אינו מפני שהוא ית' צריך לכבוד בריותיו, כ"א מפני שע"י הכרת כבוד שמים יבא האדם לכל שלימות בין בדיעות בין במעשים. ע"כ כאשר מזדמן אצל השלמים שתשוקתם אל השלימות מתגברת בהם, ויען שיודעים שיסוד חיוב כבוד שמים הוא כדי להביא את האדם אל השלימות, א"כ כשמוצאים את עצמם שלא יוכלו להבליג על רוחם הסוער, כאשר יראו בהנהגה העליונה דברים שמונעים את השלימות אע"פ שבשכלם יכירו בהכרה פנימית כי לה׳ הצדקה ולו נתכנו עלילות. אבל כאשר הכירו שבמערכי לבבם המתחמץ לא תתישב תשוקת השלימות כראוי, עד אשר יוציאו מן הכח אל הפועל מר רוחם נגד המושג להם נגד כיסופם הפנימי אל השלימות האמיתית, מצאו נכון להתיר לנפשם הרגש הקדוש הזה אע"פ שאינו ע"פ טהרת השכל, מפני שע"י התגברות הרגש לשאיפת השלימות מזה יולד באמת כבוד שמים האמיתי, שהוא בהיות יצוריו, ביחוד בעלי הבחירה שבהם, שלמים במעשיהם ובמדותיהם. וזהו "ותתפלל חנה על ה'", שרגש הסוער שלה ששפכה את נפשה בתפילה למען הרבות השלימות בעולם, התעלה אצלה יותר ממעמד שכלה שמרכז שלו הוא השגת השי"ת.

ובענין הנסתר: אם באמונות אם בחכמות. באמונות - שיזהר מהאמין הנמנעות בחקו יתברך, ולא ישים בגדר האפשר מה שהמנעו טבע קיים, והערום יתבונן איזה מן הנמנע ראוי להאמין אע"פ שאפשרותו אינו קרוב כל כך, כענין המופתים בשינוי הטבעים והפנות הנמשכות להם, שאין במניעת טבע קיים ולא בהכחשתם מופת חותך, וכל שכן שהלחיצות בסתירתם גדולות ובצורות וקשות יותר בבחינתם נחת מזה לזה; ואיזה ראוי להרחיק מכל וכל, כהתהפך הראשים בענין שוב העצם מקרה או המקרה עצם, או שהא-ל יתגשם או ישתנה או יברא כמותו, והדומים לאלו מהנמנעות במוחלט בטבע קיים.

ובחכמות - במה שאין צד אמונה תלוי בו להתחייב האמנתו מצד העיון, כמציאת השד והעדרתו, וכביטול החלק והמצאותו, ובביטול מציאות הריקות וקיומו, ואמונת ההעתק וקיומה, וייחס החיות בצומח, וכיוצא בהם, כענין חלקי הנפש ובכלל מציאותה, ושאר דברים נסכלים חשבום קצת הקדומים דברים אמיתיים; ומי יתן החרש יחרישון ותהי להם לחכמה (איוב יג ה).

Why would God create any imperfect 3-spaces at all, as opposed to filling hyperspace with nothing but perfect 3-spaces? According to Hudson, a hyperspace consisting of every 3-space worth creating (some perfect, some imperfect) is better than one consisting entirely of perfect 3-spaces mainly because the former has an appealing diversity that the latter lacks

Here I wondered whether Hudson would endorse an apparently analogous principle concerning societies: a perfect society would need to be diverse and so would need to contain some poor, ignorant, unhappy people (whose lives are worth living, but just barely); it could not contain only rich, well-educated, happy people. There seems to be pressure both to deny this principle and to grant that it's relevantly analogous to the principle underlying Hudson's account of the existence of imperfect 3-spaces

One section, which was originally published in the American Mathematical Monthly and made the topic of an article in Scientific American, presents an ingenious apparent counterexample to the famous four-color theorem in topology. (Regrettably, the illustrations are not in color.) Another section argues for the existence of a fourth spatial dimension by noting that it would explain how the Virgin Mary could have been impregnated without having been penetrated in any of the usual senses and without anything having jumped discontinuously from her exterior to her interior. (For better or worse, this section contains no illustrations.)

It seems just as unlikely that anyone has lost faith in God because of the logical problem of evil as it is unlikely that anyone has found faith in God because of the ontological argument. The logical problem of evil is an attempt to show that the existence of God is logically impossible, and the ontological argument is the attempt to show that the existence of God is logically necessary. Few people change their belief in the existence or nonexistence of God based entirely on logical argument. Yet many atheists say the reason they can’t believe in God is because of the existence of evil. When pressed to show why the existence of evil is supposed to be incompatible with faith in God, many atheists will repeat the logical problem they learned as undergraduates: the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. But when the theist rebuts the logical problem with a standard Plantinga-style free will defense, the atheist remains unconvinced. More sophisticated atheists might respond with an evidential argument, but most will not. These ‘common-sense atheists’ simply remain convinced that there is some important problem of evil even if they can’t formulate it precisely. Likewise, theists remain convinced that there is some adequate response to the logical problem of evil even if they haven’t read Plantinga and can do little more than wave their hands

So why aren’t theism and atheism subject to logical proof? What if, just as theism can be grounded in religious experience, atheism can be grounded in an experience? What if the problem of evil is not just a logical problem about God’s goodness but more fundamentally a problem about the sense of God’s presence? This would explain why atheists experience suffering as meaningless and theists experience God’s presence in the midst of suffering itself. What if the problem is discerning whether there is a personal loving basis of reality or whether the appropriate response to reality involves feelings of aloneness and alienation?

Perhaps the following line of thought can be illuminating. The status of God is one of the fundamental components of a worldview, and if we think of worldviews along the lines of Kuhnian paradigms, then we can see why no particular argument can decisively verify or falsify a worldview. At best, difficult counterarguments become puzzles to be worked out in the ‘research program’ of one’s worldview. Changing one’s belief in something as fundamental as God’s existence or nonexistence would be tantamount to a paradigm shift, but paradigm shifts don’t happen because of arguments

It is important to notice that there is an answer to Job’s complaint available to God. God could simply tell Job about the wager with Satan in Job 1. It seems significant that God doesn’t avail himself of this obvious explanation for Job’s suffering. God knows that Job’s problem isn’t his suffering itself. Job’s problem is his loss of meaning. Thus God knows that no theodicy apart from a vision of Divine beauty would be satisfactory

For Shaftesbury, conversion to theism is an aesthetic matter. We must learn to see the world as a cosmos ordered for the good – i.e., as beautiful. Becoming a theist is also an emotional matter. The result of seeing the world as beautiful is a certain emotional response, an ‘affection’ or ‘love’ for world’s beauty

For Dillard, the problem of pain is an ‘old, old mystery, as old as man, but forever fresh, and completely unanswerable’. An answer isn’t really what we want or need anyway: ‘What I have been after all along is not an explanation but a picture. This is the way the world is’ (p. 384). As Wittgenstein points out, our ‘picture’ of the world can hold us ‘captive’ if we can’t ‘get outside of it’ and see the world in a different way (Philosophical Investigations §115). ‘When we’re confused by a philosophical problem, we’re like flies bumping up against the invisible walls of a glass bottle. What we need is not an explanation of the bottle, but a reorientation that can show us ‘the way out of the fly-bottle’

In summary, to have faith in God, on Shaftesbury’s view is to have enthusiasm for creation and to love its Creator. To lose faith in God, then, would be to lose enthusiasm for creation – and to fall out of love with its Creator – due to a failure of vision, the loss of one’s ability to see the world as ordered by a loving Providence. For Shaftesbury, this can take the form of pure atheism (there is no God and hence no good ordering) or what he calls ‘demonism’ (there is an ordering god-like principle but it is not good). In any case, the effect is the same: we fall out of love with the Creator. We conclude with the Greek Sophocles and the Preacher of Ecclesiastes that it is better never to have been born. With Job, we curse the day of our birth. But since this is an aesthetic and emotional issue what we need is not a philosophical and theological explanation of evil and suffering; rather we need a Shaftesburian aesthetic experience capable of reorienting our vision and reigniting our love for God. We need a mystical vision that silences any question of theodicy without answering it

For Shaftesbury, then, the problem of theodicy was evidently an existential one, a bridge every thinking person must cross. At the same time, he thought that most of the issues at hand could not be solved

Many schools of Hindu, Buddhist and Sufi philosophy teach the principle of non-aversion which is the concept that one only experiences negativity and suffering as much as one tries to avoid it

הנסים, לדעתו [של הרמב״ם], אינם מתנגדים לחוקי הטבע, והנבואה היתה לו לחזון פסיכולוגי.

[left]Neither am I intending to disparage the long history of interpretation that exalts Abraham for his response in the Aqedah. Indeed, I respect that tradition. So when I titled part 3 of this book "Unbinding the Aqedah from the Straitjacket of Tradition," this was not intended as an insult. In biblical interpretation, no one comes to any text traditionless. Every reader is shaped by a whole series of prior readings and assumptions - and I am certainly no different. It would be impossible for me to offer an alternative reading of the Aqedah without standing on the shoulders of multitudinous others, who have already grappled with its meaning, and whose grappling I respect

Yet the question must be asked whether the tradition of prior interpretations of the Aqedah (each dependent on their particular historical context and the assumptions and interests of the interpreters) should act as a straitjacket, preventing new and fresh readings of the text. I believe they should not. Hence I have attempted to "unbind" the Aqedah from the limitations of traditional readings

However, I agree entirely with Walter Moberly that new readings of the Aqedah (especially any that are critical of Abraham) need to be grounded in careful, contextual exegesis and not simply in the predilections of the interpreter. Not only am I fully on board with Moberly here, this is precisely what I have attempted to do in this book. Here I am also following the classic advice concerning Scripture given in the Mishnah by the Hebrew sage with the endearing name of Ben Bag Bag: "Turn it over, and [again] turn it over, for all is therein. And look into it. And become gray and old therein. And do not move away from it, for you have no better portion than it."

My motivation is that a fresh encounter with this ancient text, from a new angle, raising new considerations, might not only illuminate its meaning but renew our experience of the God whom Jews and Christians believe may be encountered precisely through this text[/left]

[left]the book of Job makes the profound statement that a rationalistic orthodoxy which seeks to have the relationship of God's justice to suffering and evil neatly packaged is also inappropriate[/left]

[left]Whereas theodicy texts in the classical tradition take the form of apologetics and attempt to defend God's justice, biblical theodicy texts take the form of prayer (or at least alternate between prayer and other forms of complaint) and question, even assail, God's justice. Whereas in classical theodicy God is discussed abstractly in the third person and the apologist is expected to answer to others about God, in biblical theodicy God is addressed in direct second person speech and is expected to answer the supplicant. Whereas classical theodicy results, I have argued, in deception about the nature of evil and leads to passivity vis-à-vis the status quo, biblical theodicy is radically honest about evil, is rooted in passion, and
questions the present social arrangements in the world

Biblical theodicy, therefore, is not content with contemplation - neither the rational contemplation of philosophical arguments nor the contemplation of prayer, even lament. Such theodicy thus moves from lament, not only to thanksgiving and praise (that is, to celebration and anticipation of God's coming shalom), but also to discipleship and ethical action - to practical engagement with the world animated by a vision of that shalom[/left]

[left]I do not think it is mere coincidence that the one place where Plato attempts to resolve the theodicy problem is in the Republic (Book II, 377b-380c), where its function is precisely to legitimate social control in the ideal commonwealth by preventing questioning of divine justice[/left]

[left]The Hebrew attitude towards the apparent existence of evil in the world has generally been to adopt the principle that the individual ought not to deny his own experience[/left]

[left]It is thus difficult to resist the conclusion that the theodicy problem constitutes a rational aporia, which itself exacerbates the problem of evil for those who are interested - as I am - in theological rationality. This suggests one final criticism that may be made about the greater good defense (a criticism which may apply equally to process theodicy), namely, that it takes rationality far too seriously, privileging the deliverances of first-order logic over the testimony of both experience and the Scriptures. If indeed we are confronted with the dilemma of either 1) concocting a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil in order to render God's goodness and power logically compatible with the existence of evil, thus "solving" the theodicy problem, or 2) rejecting entirely the possibility of its rational solution, I believe we must choose the latter. For why must we have rational consistency at all costs? Logic is certainly an important value, but is it the most important value in all situations? (In particular, two considerations may be advanced in support of not holding fast to logical consistency in the case of theodicy. The first is that language about God is typically subject, as Ian Ramsey has extensively shown, to what he calls "logical impropriety" or oddness. That is, our speech about God is not always subject to standard logical rules (Ramsey 1957:53, 103, 105, 110, 123, et passim). This, combined with the consideration that evil may well be absurd, and thus ultimately inexplicable, converges on an aporetic conclusion to the theodicy problem.) Perhaps, like Job, who even after his encounter with God received no rational justification of his sufferings , we need to live with a healthy dose of agnosticism concerning theodicy

This does not mean that we should never grapple intellectually with the problem of evil. There is certainly no scriptural or other warrant for heading off a budding theodicist at the pass with a priori warning that the way is blocked. Indeed, the example of Job suggests that the aporetic nature of the theodicy problem is something to be learned by experience, through genuine struggle, and not proclaimed at the outset by fiat. Rational attempts to solve the problem of evil, like the torturous process of Job's lament, may be the only way to come to an honest understanding of the logical insolubility of the problem, in much the same way as Job - through the crucible of his experience - came to an acknowledgement of the inscrutability of the ways of God. The only warning sign necessary for an intrepid traveler is the rigorous condition that, like Job, one speak the truth about God, and - I would add - about evil[/left]

[left]More of the argument’s force is lost when one recognizes that one’s feeling that God’s existence cannot be compatible with the apparently gratuitous evils that obtain in our world is not by itself worth anything unless it unpacks in arguments that are sound and valid[/left]

[left]No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children[/left]

[left]I have already said I think that most people who are suffering are not really experiencing an intellectual problem but rather an emotional problem. Now you might think to yourself at this point, well then why go through all of this intellectual material if it’s really not the problem. Well, two reasons, I think. First of all people think that their problem is intellectual, so by working through the responses to the logical and evidential problems of evil we can help them to see what the real problem is and treat their opinion with respect. But secondly I think that what I’ve shared with you this afternoon can be of tremendous help and encouragement when you yourself are called upon to endure terrible suffering[/left]

[left]Paradoxically then, even though the problem of suffering is the greatest objection to the existence of God, at the end of the day, God is the only solution to the problem of suffering. If God does not exist then we are locked in a world filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering. God is the final answer to the problem of suffering[/left]

[left]It has frequently been observed that whatever their purely philosophical successes, classical theodicies sometimes seem to have little relevance in the lives of many religious believers, even philosophers, whose faith, so far as I can tell from reading and experience, seems untouched by their philosophical subtleties[/left]

[left]In Judaism, he [Soloveitchik] writes, the fundamental question is: What obligation does suffering impose upon man? This question is greatly beloved by Judaism, and she has placed it at the very center of her world of thought[/left]

[left]while authenticity may be a virtue, speculation per se is hardly a vice. It may very well be that speculation will yield no authentically satisfying human response to the problem of evil and suffering. But why isn't speculation itself considered an active, creative response to the human condition? Why isn't the courageous human effort to understand the mysteries of the cosmos itself a reflection of the undauntable human intellect — a point Soloveitchik himself makes in his essay "U-Bikashetem Mi-Sham"?

. . .

If there is good evidence against God's existence, traditionally conceived, then simply asserting that Judaism provides reasons for sticking my head in existentialist sand does not get me very far[/left]

[left]the atheologian maintains that belief in an omni-benevolent, omnipotent, omniscient being is inconsistent with empirical evidence that evil exists. The usual strategies for solving this problem, as noted above, have been to deny the existence of evil on metaphysical grounds, or to qualify in some way one or more of God's "omni-" attributes. Are these the only strategies available? Might there not be resources, beliefs, or attitudes within a particular faith tradition that themselves eliminate the purported inconsistency? The argument of the atheologian will work only if he or she demonstrates an inconsistency among beliefs that the theist in fact holds. If the theist doesn't hold those beliefs, then the atheologian has failed to demonstrate any irrationality. Consider, for example, the following imaginary atheological argument against Judaism: Judaism must be false because it maintains that God maximizes aesthetic pleasure, but empirical evidence shows that aesthetic pleasure in our world is not maximal. Now it is perfectly obvious that this argument fails, since one of its premises is false. Judaism does not, after all, maintain that God is an aesthetic plea- sure maximizer. Therefore we have no evidence that Judaism is false

In an important essay, Marilyn McCord Adams, who developed and popularized this way of thinking about the problem of evil, formulates the point this way: "Where the internal coherence of a system is at stake, successful arguments for its inconsistency must draw on premises internal to that system or obviously acceptable to its adherents.” While the strategy limned here, which might be called "internalist," is designed specifically to address the atheologian, it highlights an important feature of religious belief systems generally: they provide a comprehensive picture of the world to their adherents. Canons of logic are surely relevant to those who are both religious and rationalist. Nevertheless, what counts as problematic for the system depends upon what the system itself teaches. While this might seem a truism, its implications are far reaching

The internalist strategy outlined thus far appears promising enough as a strategy, and indeed it is by now widely acknowledged. Troubles arise, however, when the Jewish philosopher reads on. For the applications of this strategy in the literature smack strongly of Christian values and beliefs, altogether foreign to Judaism. Thus, McCord Adams, who in her essay addresses the problem of horrendous evils like the Holocaust, argues that certain goods "engulf horrendous evils and are incommensurate with them. These include the good of identifying with Christ, who himself, Christians believe, suffered horrendous evil for all humankind; the good of heavenly beatitude that is the reward for suffering horrendously; and the vision of God that may come by way of horrendous suffering. Based on the autobiographical writings of Simone Weil, Diogenes Allen likewise argues that suffering can yield the most perfect experience of Godly love to which humans have access, and that this good is incommensurate with the evil of suffering. Eleonore Stump suggests that evil is what she calls the mirror of good, that it is only the experience of evil that yields the most profound appreciation and experience of God's very goodness

All of these approaches share a common Christian appreciation for suffering following upon the model sufferer, Jesus himself. For exactly this reason, all of these approaches might seem problematic to the non-Christian, just as it is foreign to the spirit of Judaism, in which the predominant view is that suffering is bad, as Soloveitchik himself observes along with many others. But if the approaches developed by Marilyn McCord Adams, Diogenes Allen, and Eleonore Stump are Jewishly and — some might even wish to argue — morally problematic, the overall strategy is not. In fact, I think that the best way to read "Kol Dodi Dofek" is as a precursor to, and a Jewish version of, internalism

Halakhocentric
Judaism teaches, according to Soloveitchik, that to be truly human is to act to make oneself and the world better, and not to ponder fruitlessly the metaphysical mysteries of the cosmic economy. The very posing of the question in metaphysical terms betrays a profound misunderstanding of what it means to be a human being, indeed, makes no human sense at all. But, the atheologian might object, this is irrational. For, on the one hand, you admit that evil exists, and, on the other, you affirm belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent God. These propositions are inconsistent. If you accept the basic standards of rationality, then you must qualify or deny one or more of these beliefs

To this objection Soloveitchik would respond: Judaism teaches that to require a rational resolution of this inconsistency is itself irrational. For human rationality — the only sort to which humans have access — mandates a behavioral, not a metaphysical, response. The formulation of the problem as metaphysical rather than experiential is, according to Judaism, a profound category mistake. Therefore, there is no irrationality to the Jewish belief system. But, the atheologian would in turn object, haven't you committed a logical fallacy here by begging the question against theistic belief through appeal to a Jewish, and therefore theistic, value? To this objection Soloveitchik would respond in true internalist spirit: Your atheological argument rests on the claim that the theistic system is irrational, either because it affirms inconsistent beliefs or because it begs the question. But I have just shown you that the Jewish belief system neither affirms inconsistent beliefs nor begs the question, and is not irrational for the reasons you adduce. No one requires me to accept the Jewish belief system. But if I do, for reasons of my own, then I am not guilty of your charge of irrationality[/left]

[left]With righteous indignation, Sam Harris
condemns
the “boundless narcissism” of those who survive a disaster only to “believe themselves spared by a loving God, while this same God drowned infants in their cribs” (p. 54[/left]
‏ועיין כאן.

[left]In a world where evils strike indiscriminately, where villains prosper while children die of cystic fibrosis, anyone who credits an omnipotent God for their earthly fortune, as if God had selectively intervened on their behalf while leaving others to languish, is implying that God plays favorites in a decidedly pernicious way. The god of these faithful is no God worth worshipping but just another variant of the god of superstition

But is it even possible to believe in a God worth worshipping in a world where billions survive on less than two dollars a day?

This is just another way to pose the theological problem of evil. The problem is hardly new. Hume was paraphrasing the Ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus when he stated the problem as follows: “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” (p. 84

It’s a question no theist should ignore: Whence then is evil?

But it’s also a question that should be juxtaposed against a related one. We live in a world in which all of us are implicated in what Marilyn McCord Adams (1990, 2006) has called “horrors”: crushing evils that seem to strip the lives of those caught up in them of any positive meaning. In such a world, is it possible to view life as worth living without believing in a transcendent good that redeems the world?

It may be possible for those of us lucky enough not to have experienced horror or witnessed it firsthand and callous enough that we can ignore its pervasiveness and our own complicity. But what about the rest of us?

What we have here are two interwoven problems. The theological problem of evil is, of course, no problem for atheists; it’s simply an argument against God’s existence. They call it the “argument from evil.” The problem is faced by theists who want to reconcile their belief in God with the world’s evils

But one reason why theists want to defend their faith is because of the second problem, sometimes called the existential problem of evil. This problem isn’t about how to reconcile God’s existence with the world’s evils but how to find positive meaning in life despite them. And for many, the only viable solution comes from the promise of a transcendent good that fulfills our ethico-religious hope – in other words, from God[/left]

[left]The argument from evil is a challenge to the existence of God traditionally conceived as omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. But I have defined God less precisely – as a transcendent being who fulfills our ethico-religious hope.

To fulfill that hope, God would have to be good, and He would have to be greater than any evil (in the sense that, given God’s existence, evils would cease to have ultimate significance). But this isn’t the same as being all-powerful. So why can’t we just sidestep the problem of evil altogether by admitting that God isn’t omnipotent?

Unfortunately, the problem won’t evaporate so easily. Even if we accept that God is not all-powerful, we may still ask: Why does evil look so significant if it isn’t? If reality is fundamentally on the side of goodness, why don’t we all have a clear sense of God’s redemptive work, an awareness that evils are fleeting while the good eternal?[/left]

[left/]For what it’s worth, my own view is that, insofar as everything in the world depends absolutely on the creative and sustaining work of the creator, the world’s integrity as a separate reality, something in its own right apart from God, may depend on a radical abdication on God’s part. The act of creation may be inseparable from an act of radical divine self-restriction. Self-imposed limits on what God can legitimately do in relation to the world may constitute the very condition for the world’s existence as a reality separate from God. And this may be especially true for the independent existence of free beings. If so, then when moral horrors are perpetrated, God may be constrained so radically that all He can do is look on and weep[/left]

[left]God’s goodness may not demand that He prevent all evils; but it may well demand that He redeem them all, so that evil will never be the final word in any human life – an insight which leads Hick as well as others (such as Marilyn Adams 2002 and 2006, and Thomas Talbott 2001) to insist that a doctrine of universal salvation is essential to any successful theodicy[/left]

[left]It may well be that many of the atheists who pose the argument from evil are envisioning the evils of the world as they look from an atheist perspective. In other words, they are begging the question: they are assuming that God does not exist, attaching to the evils of the world the significance they would have, given that assumption, and then demanding a reason why God would permit evils which have such overwhelming significance. But if a redeeming God exists, they do not have such overwhelming significance after all[/left]

[left]To say that God defeats horrors is to say that God responds by making them an integral part of something valuable – which, I should note, is nothing like claiming that horrors were never really bad at all. It is one thing to say that God is so resourceful He can turn a monumental evil – say the Holocaust – into an element of a greater whole that gives positive meaning to the experiences of its victims. It is something else to say that the Holocaust is part of the “best of all possible worlds,” and that the Nazis were therefore agents of the good. The latter is appalling. The former – which says that God can take the worst that we can throw at Him and find a way to turn it to the good – is not[/left]

[left]The problem of evil may be described as the problem of reconciling belief in God with the existence of evil. But the problem of evil, like evil itself, has many faces. It may, for example, be expressed either as an experiential problem or as a theoretical problem. In the former case, the problem is the difficulty of adopting or maintaining an attitude of love and trust toward God when confronted by evil that is deeply perplexing and disturbing. Alvin Plantinga (1977: 63-64) provides an eloquent account of this problem:

The theist may find a religious problem in evil; in the presence of his own suffering or that of someone near to him he may find it difficult to maintain what he takes to be the proper attitude towards God. Faced with great personal suffering or misfortune, he may be tempted to rebel against God, to shake his fist in God’s face, or even to give up belief in God altogether… Such a problem calls, not for philosophical enlightenment, but for pastoral care

By contrast, the theoretical problem of evil is the purely “intellectual” matter of determining what impact, if any, the existence of evil has on the truth-value or the epistemic status of theistic belief. To be sure, these two problems are interconnected – theoretical considerations, for example, may color one’s actual experience of evil, as happens when suffering that is better comprehended becomes easier to bear[/left]

[left]Being finite beings we can’t expect to know all the goods God would know, any more than an amateur at chess should expect to know all the reasons for a particular move that Kasparov makes in a game. But, unlike Kasparov who in a chess match has a good reason not to tell us how a particular move fits into his plan to win the game, God, if he exists, isn’t playing chess with our lives. In fact, since understanding the goods for the sake of which he permits terrible evils to befall us would itself enable us to better bear our suffering, God has a strong reason to help us understand those goods and how they require his permission of the terrible evils that befall us[/left]

[left]The open theist therefore encourages the rejection of what has been called “meticulous providence” (Peterson 1982: chs 4 & 5) or “the blueprint worldview” (Boyd 2003: ch.2), the view that the world was created according to a detailed divine blueprint which assigns a specific divine reason for every occurrence in history. In place of this view, the open theist presents us with a God who is a risk-taker, a God who gives up meticulous control of everything that happens, thus opening himself up to the genuine possibility of failure and disappointment – that is to say, to the possibility of gratuitous evil

Open theism has sparked much heated debate and has been attacked from many quarters. Considered, however, as a response to Rowe’s [traditional] theological premise, open theism’s prospects seem dim. The problem here, as critics have frequently pointed out, is that the open view of God tends to diminish one’s confidence in God’s ability to ensure that his purposes for an individual’s life, or for world history, will be accomplished (see, for example, Ware 2000, Ascol 2001: 176-80). The worry is that if, as open theists claim, God does not exercise sovereign control over the world and the direction of human history is open-ended, then it seems that the world is left to the mercy of Tyche or Fortuna, and we are therefore left with no assurance that God’s plan for the world and for us will succeed. Consider, for example, Eleonore Stump’s rhetorical questions, put in response to the idea of a “God of chance” advocated in van Inwagen (1988): “Could one trust such a God with one’s child, one’s life? Could one say, as the Psalmist does, “I will both lay me down in peace and sleep, for thou, Lord, only makest me dwell in safety’?” (1997: 466, quoting from Psalm 4:8). The answer may in large part depend on the degree to which the world is thought to be imbued with indeterminacy or chance[/left]

[left]A problem concerns the worship-worthiness of the sort of deity being proposed. For example, would someone who is not wholly good and capable of evil be fit to be the object of our worship, total devotion and unconditional commitment? Similarly, why place complete trust in a God who is not all-powerful and hence not in full control of the world? To be sure, even orthodox theists will place limits on God’s power, and such limits on divine power may go some way towards explaining the presence of evil in the world. But if God’s power, or lack thereof, is offered as the solution to the problem of evil – so that the reason why God allows evil is because he doesn’t have the power to prevent it from coming into being – then we are faced with a highly impotent God who, insofar as he is aware of the limitations in his power, may be considered reckless for proceeding with creation[/left]